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INTRODUCTION 
In Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 
1984 ) f the Utah Supreme Court expressly held that it's ruling on 
the constitutionality of § 59-5-109 (Supp. 1981) applied 
prospectively only, except as to the six Rio Algom plaintiffs. 
The Court made this ruling, in part, because of the undue 
hardships to local governments if the ruling were applied to 
pending actions, such as Kennecott's. In addition, the Court 
made this ruling after a conscious review of the law on the 
propriety of limiting the retroactive effect of a ruling to the 
parties• The Rio Algom Court's analysis was correct at the time 
and remains good law under current constitutional principles. 
The only issue in the instant case is whether the District 
Court properly ignored the Utah Supreme Court's express holding 
and applied Rio Algom's ruling on the validity of § 59-5-109 to 
Kennecott• 
Kennecott defends the District Court's actions on three 
grounds. First, notwithstanding Rio Algom's explicit language to 
the contrary, Kennecott contends that the Rio Algom Court did not 
limit it's ruling to the plaintiffs in that case. Second, 
Kennecott seeks reversal of Rio Algom's prospectivity ruling and 
the adoption of the approach suggested by two justices in James 
B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 2439, 
115 L. Ed* 2d 481 (1991), even though that approach is not 
constitutionally mandated and is contrary to established Utah 
precedent which creates a common sense framework for balancing 
the hardships involved with retroactive rulings. Finally, 
Kennecott, without citing any relevant authority, asserts that 
its due process and equal protection rights would be violated 
unless this Court reverses Rio Alqom's prospectivity ruling. As 
discussed fully below, the Court should reject Kennecott's 
challenges to Rio Alqom's prospectivity ruling and should reverse 
the District Court's judgment ignoring that ruling. 
I. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IN RIO ALGOM CONSCIOUSLY AND 
UNAMBIGUOUSLY REFUSED TO APPLY ITS HOLDING ON THE VALIDITY 
OF § 59-5-109 TO CASES PENDING AT THE TIME OF THE RULING. 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Rio Alqom Corp. v. San 
Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984) could not have used clearer 
language in describing the retroactive effect of it's 
invalidation of § 59-5-109. The Court unambiguously and 
unequivocally states that it's ruling was prospective only, 
except as to the Rio Alqom plaintiffs. The pertinent language 
is: "[W]e direct that our holding of unconstitutionality be 
prospective . . . . As to the six plaintiff - taxpayers . . ., 
this decision shall be retroactive for the year for which this 
suit for refund was brought." Id. at 196.* No fair, reasoned 
reading of this language supports Kennecott's claim to the 
benefits of the Rio Alqom holding. Notwithstanding its 
unequivocal holding, Kennecott claims that Rio Alqom "did not 
address the situation of parties who, at the time of the 
decision, had litigation pending challenging the 
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109. . .." Brief of 
1
 It is worth noting that the Rio Alqom plaintiffs could 
only rely on the ruling for the 1981 tax year, "the year for 
which this suit for refund was brought." Id. 
2 
Respondent pg. 15. To support this assertion, Kennecott suggests 
that the Court relied upon cases which dealt with pure 
prospectivity and which did not address the issue of the 
retroactive application of a rule to pending cases. Brief of 
Respondent pg. 16 & Note 4. The implication of this argument is 
that the Court was confused about the nature of its holding as it 
applied to pending cases. Brief of Respondent pg. 15-16. 
The Rio Alaom Court's thorough analysis of the factual and 
legal basis for it's retroactivity holding belies any notion that 
the Court was confused about the scope of its holding. The Court 
specifically discussed the hardship on local government if its 
ruling were applied to pending cases. In addition, the Court 
cited to cases where the holdings were limited to the parties 
only and the Court highlighted those cases' prospectivity rulings 
by parenthetically noting the importance of the holdings to the 
Court's analysis. Thus, the Rio Alqom Court's analysis makes 
clear that the Court carefully and consciously chose to limit its 
holding to the parties only. 
The Court's analysis began with an assessment of the 
potentially devastating effect on local government of 
retroactively invalidating a tax statute, especially when the 
ruling applied to assessments which were not yet final or which 
were the subject of pending appeals. Specifically, the Court 
held: 
Since 1981, a number of owners of state-assessed properties 
have paid their taxes under protest or have filed formal 
complaints with the Tax Commission. Retroactive effect to a 
decision altering the relative tax burden between locally 
3 
assessed and state-assessed properties would require 
reopening the assessment process as to tax obligations not 
vet final. To the extent that this might result in refunds 
of taxes paid on state-assessed properties, it would impose 
indebtedness for future repayments from locally assessed 
properties• Such indebtedness could be huge in counties 
that derive high proportions of their budgets from state-
assessed properties. 
Id, at 195 (emphasis supplied). Having identified the harsh 
burdens associated with a retroactive ruling, the Court canvased 
the law in other jurisdictions to determine whether it could 
avoid these harsh results by giving its ruling prospective 
application. Based upon these authorities and the burden on 
local governments, the Rio Alqom Court concluded that it's 
holding should be given prospective effect. Id. at 196. 
The Court's analysis however was not completed. The Court 
was concerned that giving a ruling only prospective effect would 
deprive "the litigants, who have sustained the burden of 
attacking an unconstitutional statute, of the fruits of their 
victory*" 1^. at 196.2 Specifically, the Court was concerned 
about prospective rulings discouraging challenges to statutes of 
questionable validity. Addressing these criticisms, the Court 
determined to make its ruling prospective only, except as to the 
parties, and held: 
In response to these considerations, some decisions that 
give only prospective effect to a holding of 
unconstitutionality as to all other parties give the holding 
retroactive effect as to the litigants or others who have 
litigation pending. Stickland v. Newton County, supra (Ga-
parties only); Kansas City Millwright Co. v. Kalb, supra 
2
 The Court also noted that giving prospective effect only 
made the Court's opinion an advisory opinion or dicta. .Id. at 
196. 
4 
(Kan.-parties and others with action pending); Perkins v. 
County of Albermarle, supra (Va.-parties only). . . . We 
gave this kind of limited retroactive effect to a decision 
that local government legislation was unconstitutional, a 
decision that was otherwise prospective only. Carter v. 
Beaver County Service Area No. One, 16 Utah 2d 280, 283, 399 
P.2d 440, 442 (1965) . 
Id. at 196 (emphasis supplied). The Court then held that for the 
same reasons expressed in these opinions, it's ruling should be 
prospective only, except for the plaintiffs. 
The Rio Algom Court's analysis of the retroactivity issue 
establishes that it consciously chose to limit its ruling to the 
parties and to exclude those with pending claims. In its 
discussion of the hardship of a retroactive ruling, it expressly 
refers to the unfair burden on local governments if its 
constitutionality ruling were applied retroactively to taxpayers 
with pending claims. Again, in analyzing whether to give the Rio 
Algom plaintiffs the benefit of the ruling, the Court cites to 
cases which limited their ruling to the parties and 
parenthetically noted that the rulings applied only to the 
parties.3 These are the case which persuaded the Court of the 
importance of rewarding the litigants and thereby encouraging 
challenges to statutes of questionable validity. 
The Court's ruling reflects a balance between the need to 
reward litigants and the hardship of a retroactive ruling. The 
3
 Kennecott quotes from the portion of the Rio Algom 
decision which cites to cases applying rulings retroactively to 
the parties only. Kennecott, however, deletes these citations 
from it's block quote, thereby eliminating the parenthetical 
references explaining that the holdings limited the retroactive 
effect to the parties only. See Brief of Respondent at pg. 14. 
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Court addressed the first concern by giving the litigants the 
benefit of the ruling. It addressed the later issue by making 
the ruling otherwise prospective and by refusing to apply it to 
pending cases, even going so far as to limit the retroactive 
effect for the litigants to one tax year. The ruling thus must 
be viewed as a carefully tailored response to a complex issue. 
In light of the Rio Algom Court's careful consideration of 
the issue of whether it's ruling should apply to pending cases, 
the Court must reject Kennecott's contention that Rio Algom did 
not address this issue. 
II. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT REVERSE RIO ALGOM OR 
ABANDON UTAH'S COMMON SENSE APPROACH TO RETROACTIVITY. 
Rio Algom and Utah's other retroactivity rulings provide a 
wurkable frrn^work for balancing the competing interests involved 
when a court declares a statute unconstitutional or makes a new 
ruling. This Court has effectively applied this analysis in a 
number of situations. The proven effectiveness of Utah's 
approach to retroactivity strongly counsels against abandoning 
it, especially in light of the current chaos in the United States 
Supreme Court's opinions on this issue. Fortunately, Utah is not 
constitutionally mandated to follow the United States Supreme 
Court's opinions in this area. 
Kennecott urges this Court to reverse the prospectivity 
approach adopted in Rio Algom and to rule that Utah courts may 
never limit the retroactive effect of their rulings to the 
parties only. Brief of Respondent pg. 19 Note 6. For support, 
Kennecott cites the opinion of Justice Souter in James B. Beam 
6 
Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 
L.Ed.2d 481 (1991). This ruling was not constitutionally 
mandated but was based on Justice Souter's views of the 
principles of stare decisis and the rule of law generally. 
The issue of whether this Court should adopt Justice 
Souter's approach in Beam however should not be addressed in a 
vacuum. Rather, it must be considered in the light of 
what, if any, limits the United States Constitution puts on state 
court's retroactivity rulings and in the light of how the Utah 
Supreme Court has effectively dealt with this issue in a number 
of cases. With this background, a careful review of the current 
disarray in the United State Supreme Court's opinions on 
retroactivity will convince this Court not to abandon its time 
tested approach to retroactivity. 
A. The United States Constitution Provides States With The 
Freedom To Develop Retroactivity Rules Which Reflect That 
State's Supreme Court's Judicial Philosophy. 
Under the United States Constitution, state courts are 
generally free to follow their own judicial philosophies in 
determining the retroactive effect of their declarations of state 
law. More than a half century ago, Justice Cardozo described the 
interrelationship between the federal constitution and state 
retroactivity rules as follows: 
We think the Federal constitution has no voice upon the 
subject. A state in defining the limits of adherence to 
precedent may make a choice for itself between the principle 
of forward operation and that of relation backward. It may 
say that decisions of its highest court, though later 
overruled, are law none the less for intermediate 
transactions. . . . On the other hand, it may hold to the 
ancient dogma that the law declared by its courts had a 
7 
Platonic or ideal existence before the act of declaration, 
in which event the discredited declaration will be viewed as 
if it had never been, and the reconsidered declaration as 
law from the beginning. . . . The choice for any state may 
be determined by the luristic philosophy of the judges of 
her courts, their conceptions of law, its origin and nature. 
We review not the wisdom of their philosophies, but the 
legality of their acts. 
Great Northern Railway Co, v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co,, 287 
U.S. 358, 364-365 (1932)(emphasis supplied). 
The Utah Supreme Court is thus free to develop its own rules 
of retroactivity using "the juristic philosophy of the judges of 
her courts," The United State Supreme Court's opinion on the 
retroactive effect of that Court's rulings on federal law do not 
bind this Court. To the extent that this Court finds those 
opinions persuasive, it may choose to adopt them as the law of 
Utah. However, Utah's law on retroactivity is not in need of 
repair and would not benefit from an infusion of "juristic 
philosophy" of other courts. 
B. Rio Algom And Other Utah Supreme Court Cases Create A 
Rational, Workable Framework For Assessing The Competing 
Retroactivity Interests. 
The Utah Supreme Court's judicial philosophy is to approach 
the retroactivity issue pragmatically. The issue "is not a 
question of judicial power," Van Dyke v. Chappell, 818 P.2d 
1023, 1025 (Utah 1991) and its resolution is not constrained by 
constitutional limitations. Loyal Order of Moose v. County Bd. 
of Egualization, 657 P.2d 257, 264 (Utah 1982). Rather, the 
retroactive effect of a ruling depends "solely upon an appraisal 
of the relevant judicial policies to be advanced." Van Dyke, 
8 
supra, 818 P.2d at 1025. The Court has described the factors 
guiding the retroactivity analysis as follows: "When we conclude 
that there has been justifiable reliance on the prior state of 
the law or the retroactive operation of the new law may otheirwise 
create undue burden, the Court may order that the decision apply 
only prospectively." Id. at 1025. This balancing approach 
permits the Court to assess fully the actual impact of its ruling 
and to minimize any harshness/ 
Rio Alaom illustrates the effectiveness of Utah's 
approach to the retroactivity issue. In each case, the Court 
faced the prospect of retroactively overturning a state statute 
on which local governments had relied in serving their citizens. 
The Court also faced litigants who had successfully challenged 
Lhe statute and had some claim to the fruits of Lheir labors. By 
balancing these interests and limiting its holding to the 
parties, the Court was able to limit the undue burden of a 
retroactive ruling, yet reward the litigants and thereby 
encourage future challenges to questionable statutes. 
4
 An early example of Utah's realistic approach to 
retroactivity is Carter v. Beaver County Service Area, 39 9 P.2d 
440 (Utah 1965). There, the plaintiff challenged the creation of 
the Beaver County service area claiming that the statute under 
which it was created violated the Utah constitution by usurping 
local governmental powers. The Court held the statute 
unconstitutional but limited the retroactive effect of its ruling 
to the parties only. Although not expressly stated, the Court 
was apparently concerned about the potential disruptive effect of 
a retroactive ruling invalidating service areas already created, 
some of which may have partially completed their projects. By 
limiting its ruling to the parties, the Court was able to tailor 
its ruling to eliminate the hardship of a retroactive ruling. 
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C. The Rationale Of Justice Souter's Opinion In Beam Does Not 
Provide A Sufficient Basis For Utah To Abandon The Rio Algom 
Approach To Retroactivity, 
Kennecott urges the Court to reverse Rio Algom's 
retroactivity ruling because it limited its holding to the 
parties only. Kennecott does not challenge the underlying 
ruling's rationale which was to avoid the undue hardship of 
retroactivity while not discouraging challenges to statutes of 
questionable validity. Instead, Kennecott offers the reasoning 
of Justice Souter's opinion in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. 
Georgia, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991). 
Whatever confusion has arisen because of the United States 
Supreme Court's seemingly irreconcilable opinions, no question 
can exist of their limited applicability to the issue of the 
retroactive effect of state court decisions on state law. First, 
the Beam opinions concerned only the retroactive effect of 
decisions establishing federal law.5 Second, none of the Beam 
opinions suggests that the United States Constitution requires 
state courts to adopt federal retroactivity analysis in cases 
dealing with state law.6 As a result, the Utah Supreme Court is 
5
 This fact is made clear by Justice Souter whose opinion 
stated that "the antecedent choice-of-law question is a federal 
one where the rule at issue derives from federal law, 
constitutional or otherwise" Beam, supra, 115 L.Ed.2d at 488, 
and who framed the issue as "whether it is error to refuse to 
apply a rule of federal law retroactively after the case 
announcing the decision had already done so." Beam, supra, 115 
L.Ed.2d at 491. 
6
 Justice Scalia relies on Article III of the United 
States Constitution in finding that all federal court decisions 
are automatically retroactive. Beam, supra, 115 L.Ed. 2d at 497. 
Justice Souter on the other hand finds support for his rejection 
10 
not bound by these rulings but may adopt them as the law of Utah 
to the extent it finds their reasoning persuasive. 
The discussion that follows describes the analyses of the 
Beam opinions. It is divided into two parts. The first part is 
a brief discussion of two United State Supreme Court rulings 
which help put the Beam opinions in prospective. The second part 
is a discussion of the conflicting rationales and approaches 
evidenced by the separate opinions of Justices Scalia, Souter and 
O'Connor in Beam. This later part highlights how Justices 
Scalia's and Souter's opinions,- which reject selective 
prospectivity, are inconsistent with Utah's retroactivity law and 
shows why they should not be adopted as the law in Utah. 
1. Equitable Considerations Have An Important Role In The 
Uniw^d States Supreme Court's Rulings In Chevron Oil And 
McKesson. 
Before addressing Chevron Oil and McKesson, it is important 
to distinguish between retroactivity as a choice-of-law issue and 
retroactivity as a remedy issue. The choice-of-law issue is 
simply whether a new rule should apply to facts or cases which 
arose before the new rule was declared. Stated differently, the 
issue is whether the court should choose to apply the new or old 
rule. When the new or old rule concerns federal law, the choice-
of-law issue is governed by federal law. This aspect of 
retroactivity is addressed in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 
97 (1971). 
of selective prospectivity, in part, in the principles of stare 
decisis and the rule of law without relying on the constitution. 
Beam, supra, 115 L.Ed. 2d at 489. 
11 
The remedy aspect of retroactivity comes into play after the 
court chooses to apply new law to the parties whose actions 
occurred before the new ruling. At that point, the court must 
determine what remedy should govern the application of the new 
law. This aspect of the retroactivity analysis is addressed in 
McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages, 496 U.S. 18/ 
110 L.Ed.2d 17 (1990). 
The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Chevron Oil 
addresses the question of whether a prior ruling concerning the 
appropriate statute of limitations should be given retroactive 
effect so as to bar the plaintiff's claim.7 In analyzing this 
issue, the Court adopted a three part test: 
First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must 
establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear 
past precedent on which the litigants may have relied, or by 
deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was 
not clearly foreshadowed. Second, . . . [the court] must . 
. . weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to 
the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and 
effect and whether retrospective operation will further or 
retard its operation. Finally, [a court must] weigh the 
inequity imposed by retroactive application, for where a 
decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable 
results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in 
our cases for avoiding the injustice or hardship by a 
holding on nonretroactivity. 
Id. at 106-07 (emphasis supplied). Applying this test, the Court 
refused to apply the new rule to bar the plaintiff's claim 
retroactively. The analysis set forth in Chevron has been 
7
 Under the new rule, the plaintiff's claims would have 
been barred before the new ruling was issued. Chevron Oil, 
supra, 404 U.S. at 105. 
12 
followed in many federal cases and adopted by several state 
courts. 
In McKesson, the Court discuses the remedy aspect of the 
retroactivity issue. McKesson was part of the litigation flowing 
from the ruling in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 
(1984) that declared unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause 
state taxing statutes which preferred local business. After the 
Bacchus ruling, Florida amended its statute making superficial 
changes but effectively retaining the local preferences found 
objectionable in Bacchus. The plaintiff in McKesson challenged 
the statute in Florida's state court. The Florida Supreme Court 
found the statute unconstitutional under Bacchus, granted 
injunctive and declaratory relief, biv. refused to award a refund 
for taxes paid under the new statute* 
On appeal, Justice Brennan summarily disposed of the choice-
of-law issue, i.e. whether the Florida Supreme Court's decision 
declaring the tax unconstitutional should be applied 
retroactively to taxes arising prior to that decision. As 
Justice Brennan noted regardless of which choice-of-law 
approached applied, the Florida Supreme Court's decision applied 
retroactively. McKesson, supra, 110 L.Ed.2d at 32 Note 15. 
Thus, there was no question that the taxes were collected 
pursuant to a statute, unconstitutional as to the plaintiff. 
Since Florida had collected a tax unconstitutional under the 
Commerce Clause, the McKesson Court addressed rememdy issue and 
held that prospective relief did not satisfy federal law and the 
13 
state was required "to provide meaningful backward-looking relief 
to rectify any unconstitutional deprivation," McKesson, supra, 
110 L.Ed.2d at 32. The Court however made clear that the state 
had some flexibility in fashioning a retrospective remedy. 
McKesson, supra, 110 L.Ed.2d at 37-40. 
2. The Various Opinions In Beam Contain No Unifying Analysis 
Which Justifies Reversing Rio Alqom. 
The various opinions in Beam contain no unifying analysis 
which justifies reversing Rio Alqom. This is illustrated by 
considering the rationales underlying the three approaches 
championed by Justices Scaliaf Souter and O'Connor. These 
opinions describe the approaches offered in the various 
opinions.8 
8
 In Beam, the justices issued five opinions none of 
which garnered more than three justices support. Justice 
Souter's opinion was joined by Justice Stevens. Justice White 
wrote a concurring opinion. Justices Scalia and Blackmun wrote 
separate concurring opinions in which they each joined the others 
and in which Justice Marshall joined. Justice O'Connor wrote a 
dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Kennedy joined. 
In American Trucking Assn's. v. Smith, 110 L.Ed.2d 148 
(1990), the Court also addressed the choice-of-law retroactivity 
issue. This case resulted in three opinions which for the most 
part track the views expressed in Beam. Justice O'Connor wrote 
the plurality opinion and was joined by the Chief Justice and 
Justices White and Kennedy. Justice Scalia concurred in the 
judgment because of his disagreement with the substantive law 
issues, not because of his opinion on retroactivity. He thereby 
made Justice O'Connor's opinion the opinion of the Court. 
Justice Stevens wrote a dissent in which Justices Brennan, 
Marshall and Blackmun joined. 
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Beam, like McKesson, involves Bacchus's invalidation of 
state tax laws under the Commerce Clause.9 However, unlike 
McKesson, the challenged statute was enacted and the challenged 
tax was paid before the Bacchus ruling. The issue thus was 
whether the Bacchus ruling should be applied retroactively to 
make invalid a tax which had been valid when incurred.10 A 
sharply divided Court determined that the Bacchus decision 
should be applied retroactively to invalidate the taxes incurred 
before Bacchus was decided.11 
a. The Rationale For Automatic Retroactivity In All Cases 
Exalts Theoretical Purity At The Expense of Litigants' 
Reasonable Expectation Interests. 
Justice Scalia, Marsh \1, and Blackmun espouse the theory of 
automatic retroactivity in all cases. The rationale for this 
approach is found in Article III of the United States 
Constitution and these justices' philosophical beliefs about the 
role of courts. According to this view, the judicial role is to 
declare what the law already is; it is not to create the law. 
9
 In American Trucking, the taxpayer sought retroactive 
application of the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
American Trucking Association v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987) 
which, like Bacchus, found a state statute invalid under the 
Commerce Clause. 
10
 In American Trucking, the taxpayer also challenged taxes 
arising after the Scheiner decision established the new rule. 
All the Justices agreed that taxes arising after the Court's 
ruling declaring the statute unconstitutional must be refunded. 
11
 In American Trucking, the Courtf in a plurality opinion 
written by Justice O'Connor refused to retroactively apply the 
ruling in Scheiner. 
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Once this role is defined, Justice Scalia and those adopting his 
view then easily conclude that all constitutional "declarations" 
must be retroactive. Justice Scalia reasoned as follows: "Since 
the constitution does not change from year to year; since it does 
not conform to our decisions, but our decision are supposed to 
conform to it; the notion that our interpretation of the 
Constitution in a particular decision could take prospective form 
does not make sense." American Trucking Ass'n, supra, 110 L.Ed. 
2d at 174-75 (Opinion of Justice Scalia). Although courts 
theoretically declare law, Justice Scalia concedes that "in a 
real sense" courts make law. Beam, supra, 115 L.Ed.2d at 497. 
However, to be consistent with the judicial role, Justice Scalia 
believes that judges must make law "as chough they were 'binding' 
it" even though this raises practical problems when precedents 
are overruled. Justice Scalia, however, finds these difficulties 
to be a "one of the understood checks upon the judicial law 
making power," since these difficulties make it harder to 
overrule precedent. Beam, supra, 115 L.Ed.2d at 497. 
In Rio Alqom, this Court rejected the theory that a law, 
once declared unconstitutional, is void from its inception. Rio 
Alqom, supra, 681 P.2d at 196. However the most telling critique 
of Justice Scalia's view is Justice White's opinion in Beam. 
Plainly enough, Justices Scalia, Marshall, and Blackmun 
would depart from our precedents [including Chevron Pill. 
Justice Scalia would do so for two reasons, . . . . First, 
even though the Justice is not naive enough (nor does he 
think the Framers were naive enough) to be unaware that 
judges in a real sense "make" law, he suggest that judges 
(in an unreal sense, I suppose) should never concede that 
they do and must claim that they do no more than discover 
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it, hence suggesting that there are citizens who are naive 
enough to believe them. Second, Justice Scalia, fearful of 
our ability and that of other judges to resist the 
temptation to overrule prior cases, would maximize the 
injury to the public interest when overruling occurs, which 
would tend to deter them from departing from established 
precedent. 
I am quite unpersuaded by this line of reasoning. . . . 
Beam, supra, 115 L.Ed.2d at 495. 
This Court should also be unpersuaded by Justice Scalia's 
unrealistic view of the role of judges and the real world costs 
of changes in the law, costs which in some cases cannot be 
avoided as courts' understanding of the law evolves, grows, and 
improves. As Justice White has noted, these costs may become so 
high that absent a method by which courts can control the costs 
by making rulings prospective, cases which ought to be overruled 
may not be. Quill Corporation v. North Dakota, 119 L.Ed.2d 91, 
120 (1992)(White, J., Concuring in part and dissenting in part). 
The real world requires a common sense approach to what courts 
really do when they make law. 
b. Principles Of "Stare Decisis" And "Rule of Law" Do Not 
Require An Abandonment Of Utah's Approach To Retroactivity. 
Justice Souter's Beam opinion rejects the notion that a 
ruling may never be retroactively applied to the parties only. 
He bases this conclusion on the belief that limiting 
retroactivity to the parties in civil cases is not necessary to 
foster challenges to laws of questionable validity. In addition, 
Justice Souter believes that selective prospectivity is 
inconsistent with stare decisis and the rule of law generally. 
17 
Neither of these rationales constitutionally binds this Court, 
nor should they persuade this Court to reverse Rio Algom. 
Justice Souter's view of incentives is directly contrary to 
this Court's view. Justice Souter's position as expressed in 
Beam is that selective prospectivity is not necessary as an 
incentive because even purely prospective relief provides 
sufficient incentive to a litigant to challenge the 
constitutionality of questionable statutes. 
When the Rio Algom Court addressed this issue, it reached 
the opposite conclusion. In Rio Algom, the Court first found 
that the "new" rule should be applied prospectively because of 
the hardships of a retroactive ruling. The Court however then 
considered the is,c of incentives and found that selective 
prospectivity fostered challenges to questionable statutes. 
Justice Souter's opinion offers nothing new to refute the Rio 
Algom analysis and his analysis of the incentives issue should be 
rejected for the reasons set forth in Rio Algom. 
Justice Souter's other rationale for rejecting selective 
prospectivity is that it "breaches the principle that litigants 
in similar situations should be treated the same, a fundamental 
component of stare decisis and the rule of law generally." Beam, 
supra, 115 L.Ed.2d at 489. Justice Souter does not rely upon the 
Equal Protection Clause for his position on equal treatment and 
it apparently has its origin the opinions of Justice Harlan. 
More importantly, he recognizes that even under his approach 
similarly situated persons are treated differently. However, in 
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Justice Souter's view, the cost of providing equality in those 
situations justifies disparate treatment that some might deem 
arbitrary. Beam, supra, 115 L.Ed,2d at 492-93. 
The Court ought not accept Justice Souter's view of where 
the retroactivity line should be drawn. His view creates an 
absolute rule prohibiting selective prospectivity and does not 
permit the court to properly take into account the dual concerns 
of protecting local governments from the harshness of retroactive 
rulings and of rewarding litigants who successfully challenge a 
law* 
These dual concerns are not more evident than when a tax 
statute is challenged. In such a case, retroactive invalidation 
will almost always cause huge hardships to l^ >cal governments who 
have collected and spent taxes in reliance on presumptively valid 
statutes. Litigants on the other hand would have little 
incentive to challenge a statute if the prospects of a purely 
prospective ruling were substantial. The incentive for these 
litigants would be simply to wait for someone else to incur the 
expense of challenging a questionable statute. Once the statute 
is declared unconstitutional, all will benefit from the ruling 
without incurring the risk or expense.12 
12
 Assuming arguendo that Justice Souter's equality 
concerns justified the rejection of selective prospectivity, 
which they do not, any ruling reversing Rio Alqom's retroactivity 
analysis should be prospective only so as not to defeat the very 
fairness and equality concerns espoused by Justice Souter. 
Unlike the Court in Beam, this Court faces an earlier holding 
which expressly limited the retroactive application of a ruling 
to the parties for a specific tax year. Needless to say, many 
taxpayers (including the Rio Alqom parties) and the courts have 
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c. The Complexity Of Retroactivity Determinations Requires 
The Application Of A Flexible Standard. 
Justice O'Connor's discussion of the Chevron Oil 
test shows that a careful consideration of the equities is 
necessary to insure fairness. First, Justice O'Connor notes: "If 
Justice Souter is concerned with fairness, he cannot ignore 
Chevron Oil; the purpose of the Chevron Oil test is to determine 
the equities of retroactive application of a new rule." She also 
analyzes the stare decisis implications of the Chevron Oil test 
and that a decision not to apply a law is consistent with stare 
decisis• 
A decision not to apply a new rule retroactively is based 
on principles of stare decisis. By not applying the law-
changing decision retroactively, a court respects the 
settled expectations that have built up around the old law. 
If a Chevron Oil analybis reveals, as it does, that 
retroactive application of Bacchus would unjustly undermine 
settled expectations, stare decisis dictates strongly 
against the Court's holding [that Bacchus be applied 
retroactively]. 
Beam, supra, 115 L.Ed.2d at 498, 499. Based on the Chevron Oil 
test, Justice O'Connor would have found that the Bacchus ruling 
should not have been given retroactive effect in either Bacchus 
or Beam. 
Although Justice O'Connor did not address the issue of 
whether selective prospectivity is consistent with Chevron Oil, 
accepted Rio Alaom at face value and have not pursued or have 
dismissed challenges to assessments which have now become finial. 
The only difference between these persons and Kennecott is that 
the former accepted the Rio Alqom's plain language limiting its 
holding to the parties for a specific tax year. To avoid this 
unfairness and unequal treatment, any rejection of selective 
prospectivity should be prospective only. 
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the Supreme Court of Colorado has confronted that issue in Martin 
Marietta Corp, v. Lorenzo, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992). Prior to 
Marietta, the Colorado Court of Appeals had recognized a public 
policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine and applied 
the holding to the parties. Cronk v. Intermountain Rural 
Electric Ass'n., 765 P.2d 619 (Colo. App. 1988). The issue 
before the Colorado Supreme Court in the Marietta case was 
whether persons whose cause of action arose before Cronk could 
benefit from the ruling. In addressing the applicability of the 
Chevron Oil test to this issue after Beam, the Court first noted 
Justice Souter's refusal to follow Chevron Oil and held: 
In the instant case, we could employ Justice Souter's 
analysis and conclude that, as a matter of state law, once a 
new rule of substantive law, such as the Cronk rule, is 
applied to litigants then before the court, it must be 
applied to all others not barred by procedural requirements 
or res judicata. We decline, however, to follow such a 
course. Because we deal in this case with the issue of the 
retroactive application of a state judicial decision 
announcing a rule of tort law and not a rule deriving from 
federal constitutional or statutory law, we continue to 
adhere to the Chevron analysis in resolving the issue of 
retroactive or prospective application of the state judicial 
decision. 
Id. at 112 Note 7. Having rejected Justice Souter's analysis, 
the Colorado Supreme Court weighed the equities under the Chevron 
Oil test and found the new rule retroactive. 
The Utah Supreme Court should also reject Justice Souter's 
analysis and reaffirm its flexible retroactivity analysis found 
in Rio Algom and followed in its other cases. This analysis 
permits the Court to assess fully the competing fairness, equity, 
and policy interests at stake when a retroactivity issue arises. 
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This analysis, more importantly, permits the Court to tailor its 
ruling to the needs of a particular case without the unnecessary 
limits and inflexibility which would come with the adoption of 
automatic retroactivity or the rejection of selective 
prospectivity. 
III. THE APPLICATION OF RIO ALGOM'S RETROACTIVITY RULING DOES NOT 
VIOLATE KENNECOTT'S DUE PROCESS OR EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS. 
A. Under McKesson, An Individuals Due Process Rights Are Not 
Involved Until After The Court Determines That The "New" Law 
Applies To The Individual's Actions. 
Kennecott asserts that a refusal to give it the benefit of 
Rio Alqom's invalidation of § 59-5-109 would violate Kennecott's 
due process rights as described in McKesson. That decision 
however does not recognize a due process limitation on a court's 
choice between applying an "old" lav. :>r applying a "new* law 
retroactively. In McKesson, there was no dispute that the "new" 
law applied retroactively. The only issue was what relief was 
required to remedy the violation of the new law. 
McKesson has no application here, because it deals with 
remedy, not choice-of-law issues. In the instant case, the "new" 
law is Rio Alqom's invalidation of § 59-5-109 and it does not 
apply to Kennecott because the Court limited its ruling to the 
parties only. Since this "new" rule does not apply to Kennecott, 
§ 59-5-109 was valid as to Kennecott for the years prior to Rio 
Alqom and remedy is not an issue. 
For these same reasons, Smith v. Travis County Education 
District, 791 F. Supp. 1170 (W.D. Tx 1992) vacated on other 
grounds 968 F.2d 453 (Cir. 5 1992) also has no application here. 
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It should however be noted that Travis dealt with the issue of 
whether due process required a state to give taxpayers a remedy 
for taxes collected after a statute was declared 
unconstitutional. The Court specifically noted that no due 
process violations existed as to taxes incurred before the 
statute was declared unconstitutional. Travis, supra, 791 F. 
Supp. at 1201. Since Kennecott's tax liability was incurred 
before Rio Alaom invalidated the statute, Travis stands for the 
proposition that Kennecott's tax payment does not violate the Due 
Process Clause. 
A. Kennecottrs Equal Protection Rights Are Not Violated By Rio 
Alqom's Retroactivity Ruling. 
Kennecott claims that its equal protection rights are 
violated by Rio Alqom's retroactivity ruling. Kennecott supports 
this proposition by citing Justice Souter's opinion in Beam. 
However, Justice Souter's references to equality of treatment 
were not founded on the Equal Protection Clause of the United 
States Constitution but rather found their origins in the 
principles of "stare decisis and the rule of law generally." 
Beam, supra, 115 L.Ed.2d at 489. Thus, Justice Souter's opinion 
does not support Kennecott's equal protection claims and the 
other cases cited by Kennecott do not address the equal 
protection implications, if any, of rulings limiting the 
retroactivity application of new laws. 
In addition, Kennecott's equal protection claim cannot 
withstand close factual scrutiny. As a threshold matter, 
Kennecott is not treated differently from the Rio Alqom 
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plaintiffs. Under the Rio Algom ruling, the plaintiffs were 
limited to challenging their taxes for 1981 and were not 
permitted to use the invalidation of § 59-5-109 to challenge 
assessments for subsequent years. Thus, the Rio Algom 
plaintiffs, like Kennecott in the instant case, can not use Rio 
Algom's invalidation of the statute to challenge their 1983 
taxes. In other words, for the 1983 tax year, Kennecott is 
treated the same as the Rio Algom plaintiffs. 
More importantly, Kennecott has failed to prove that any 
difference in treatment between Kennecott and the Rio Algom 
plaintiffs is not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental 
purpose. The Rio Algom Court set forth in some detail the 
reasons why its ruling was prospective only, except for the 
parties. Kennecott has not sustained its burden of showing that 
these reasons are not legitimate governmental purposes or that 
the classification drawn are not reasonably related to those 
purposes. Without such a showing, Kennecott's equal protection 
claim must fail. 
DATED this day of November, 1992. 
PAUL VAN DAM 
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